Dillenberger (2010) introduced the negative certainty independence (NCI) axiom, which captures the "certainty e¤ect"phenomenon. He left open the question of whether there are continuous and monotone preference relations over simple lotteries, that satisfy NCI but do not belong to the Betweenness class of preferences considered by Chew (1989) and Dekel (1986) . We answer this question in the a¢ rmative.
Introduction
Dillenberger (2010) suggests negative certainty independence (henceforth NCI) as a behavioral axiom, imposed on preferences over monetary lotteries, that captures Kahneman and Tversky's (1979) idea of "certainty e¤ect". NCI is a weakening of the standard vNM independence that can accommodate, for example, the typical behavior reported in experimental studies of the Allais paradoxes (common ratio and common consequence e¤ects). Dillenberger explored the implications of NCI in other domains, and establishes an equivalence between static preferences that satisfy NCI, dynamic preferences that display preferences for one-shot resolution of uncertainty, and preferences over information structures that rank perfect information as the most valuable information system. The leading example of a known model that satis…es NCI is Gul's (1991) theory of disappointment aversion. 1 All known examples, including Gul's model, belong to the class of Betweenness preferences, studied in Chew (1989) and Dekel (1986 
The model and main result
Consider an interval [w; b] = X R of monetary prizes. Let L be the set of all simple lotteries (probability measures with …nite support) over X. For each p, q 2 L and 2 (0; 1), the mixture p + (1 ) q 2 L is the simple lottery that yields each prize x with probability p (x)+(1 ) q (x). We denote by x 2 L the degenerate lottery that gives the prize x with certainty, that is, x (x) = 1. Note that for any lottery p 2 L we have
We impose the following axioms on : Axiom 1 (Preference Relation). The relation is complete and transitive.
Axiom 2 (Continuity). The relation is continuous in the topology of weak convergence.
We say that p …rst-order stochastically dominates q if for every nondecreasing function
Axiom 3 (Monotonicity). If p …rst-order stochastically dominates q then p q:
The next axiom was introduced and motivated by Dillenberger (2010) ; it is a weakening of the vNM-independence axiom that takes into account the "certainty e¤ect." Axiom 4 (Negative Certainty Independence (NCI)). For all p; q; x 2 L and 2
In words, the axiom states that if the decision-maker weakly prefers a lottery to a degenerate lottery yielding a sure monetary prize, then mixing both lotteries with the same third lottery (using the same weight) should not reverse the preference. Roughly speaking, the idea is that a sure outcome su¤ers more (or gains less) than any lottery from mixtures that eliminate its certainty appeal. As we pointed out in the introduction, NCI played a key role in the analysis of Dillenebrger (2010). 2 The next axiom, which was …rst introduced by Chew (1989) and Dekel (1986) , is a di¤erent weakening of the vNM-independence axiom and is called Betweenness.
Betweenness implies neutrality towards mixture of two indi¤erent lotteries. 3 Dillenberger (2010) left open the question of whether there are continuous and monotone preference relations over L 1 that satisfy NCI but not Betweenness. 4 The next proposition gives an a¢ rmative answer.
There is a continuous and monotone function V : L ! R, which represents preferences that satisfy NCI but not Betweenness. A and B; respectively, with the option that yields $0 for sure). NCI is consistent with this behavior, since the only pattern of choice which is inconsistent with NCI is the pair (B; C); this pattern, however, is rarely observed. 3 Therefore, Betweenness indi¤erence curves in any probability triangle are straight lines, though, unlike in Expected Utility, they need not be parallel. 4 Without continuity and monotonicity, it is relatively easy to construct preferences that satisfy NCI and not betweenness. For example, let V (p) = P i U (x i ; p) p (x i ), where
and v (x) > u (x) for all x. These discontinuous preferences …rst studied by Schmidt (1998) and further analyzed in, for example, Andreoni and Sprenger (2009). These preferences satisfy NCI:
These preferences violate Betweenness. For example, take u (x) = x and v (x) = 2x, and observe that For i = 1; 2, denote by e i (p) the expected utility of a lottery p 2 L using the function u i , that is,
We now verify that V satis…es all properties in Proposition 1. 5 Since both u 1 and u 2 are continuous and bounded, their respective expectations are also continuous and thus V is continuous. To show monotonicitiy, note that if p …rst-order stochastically dominates q, then e i (p) > e i (q) for i = 1; 2 and thus V (p) > V (q) as required.
To show that NCI is satis…ed, we …rst de…ne, for a given lottery p, the lotteries p L , p M , and p H as the restrictions of p to outcomes, respectively, strictly less than n, between n and m, and strictly larger than m. Let L ; M ; and H be the probabilities assigned to each interval by p. Then
Note that
and that
where
5 When discuss these properties, we use the function V and the underlying preferences interchangeably.
Suppose that NCI is not satis…ed. Then there exists p; q; x and 2 (0; 1) such that
Without loss of generality, let V ( x ) = e k ( x ) e j ( x ); where fj; kg = f1; 2g. That is, if k = 1 then V ( x ) = x, and if k = 2 then V ( x ) = m+x 2
. From (2) we have,
so that
By (3),
, which is a contradiction to (4). (5) implies that e j ( p + (1 ) q) < e j ( x + (1 ) q) and, therefore,
Thus e k ( x ) e j (p) < e j ( x ), which implies that e k ( x ) 6 = e j ( x ). Then there are two possibilities: either x < n or x > m.
If x < n then e 1 ( x ) = x < x+n 2 = e 2 ( x ), so k = 1. By (4), e 1 (p) = e k (p) e k ( x ) = x:
Recall from (1) that (p) n. Since e 1 (p) x, e 2 (p) = (p) + e(p) 2 n + x 2 = e 2 ( x ).
Equivalently, e j (p) e j ( x ), which is a contradiction to (6). If x > m then e 1 ( x ) = x > x+m 2 = e 2 ( x ), so k = 2. By (6), e 1 (p) = e j (p) < e j ( x ) = x:
Recall from (1) that (p) n. Since e 1 (p) < x, e 2 (p) = (p) + e(p) 2 < m + x 2 = e 2 ( x ).
Equivalently, e k (p) < e k ( x ), which is a contradiction to (4) . Lastly, we show that V violates Betweenness. Pick 0 < " < min f2 (n w) ; b m; m ng and consider the lotteries p =
